U.S.-China mutual tariff rates after the trade talks

U.S.-China mutual tariff rates after the trade talks

Dr. Ning Jingxin, Assistant Professor at the University of International Business and Economics, has just shared her latest calculations on tariff levels: over the next 90 days, the U.S.’s arithmetic average tariff on Chinese goods will be 53.07%, while China’s average tariff on U.S. goods will be 32.94%. These figures are quite close to my rough estimates of 52% and 30% respectively, which I mentioned during a media interview earlier today.

Currently, there are varying claims online. Some use different metrics—for example, arithmetic average versus weighted average. Others only count tariff increases since the beginning of this year, ignoring pre-existing tariffs. Some statements are simply inaccurate. For instance, the claim that “since April 2, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods have increased by 10%, while Chinese tariffs have dropped by 5%” is incorrect. In reality, both sides have increased tariffs by roughly 10%.

While calculating average tariffs may seem straightforward, it actually involves several complexities. For instance, weighted averages require choosing appropriate weights and addressing the issue of endogeneity. Arithmetic averages involve converting specific duties (by quantity) into ad valorem equivalents. It’s also common for different analysts to derive slightly different results using the same indicators. What matters is that each calculation uses a consistent methodology.

The current gap in arithmetic average tariffs between the two sides primarily stems from how China has responded to the U.S.’s 20% fentanyl-related tariffs. China’s approach combines targeted tariff retaliation with broader non-tariff countermeasures. The targeted tariff response applies to a limited number of product codes, so it has a minimal impact on the arithmetic average. Non-tariff measures, by definition, are not reflected in tariff rates, unlike the U.S. side’s flat 20% increase.

Nonetheless, China’s countermeasures are equally strong and effective. This is not a matter of which side has “lost” more. Future negotiations between China and the U.S. will likely address the fentanyl-related tariffs. If both sides agree to remove their respective tariffs and countermeasures in this area, their arithmetic average tariff levels should become roughly equivalent.

Brief Commentary: Insights on the China-U.S. Joint Statement from the Geneva Trade Talks

On May 12, China’s Ministry of Commerce published the “Joint Statement on the China-U.S. Geneva Trade Talks” (hereinafter referred to as the “Joint Statement”). Below is a brief interpretation and commentary by the author. The statement may be further discussed on CCTV-4’s “Focus Today” program at 9:30 PM on May 12.

Mutual Respect.
The term “mutual respect” appeared multiple times—within the Joint Statement, in U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent’s interview with reporters, and during China's official press briefing. China has defined the real meaning of mutual respect through both its will and strength. On April 2, the U.S. introduced a “reciprocal tariff” plan, warning that any country that retaliated would face further escalation. Yet since then, China has issued three rounds of comprehensive reciprocal countermeasures. Now, both sides have agreed to remove tariffs amounting to 91% of the two rounds of escalation. Regarding the 34% tariffs announced by the U.S. on April 2, China has conditionally suspended or maintained countermeasures depending on how U.S. actions evolve. China firmly safeguarded its right to retaliate against unilateral tariffs that violate WTO rules. The U.S. has backed away from its long-held position since 2018 that “you can’t retaliate if I raise tariffs.” That position is now gone.

De-escalation.
The Joint Statement represents a step toward eliminating unilateral tariffs that do not comply with WTO norms. Both sides agreed to cancel 91% of the respective 125% tariff measures (U.S. and China), suspend 24% for 90 days, and retain only 10%. Compared to previous escalations, this results in a significant 115% reduction in tariff coverage on both sides. These measures have helped ease U.S.-China trade tensions and positively contributed to global economic stability and the bilateral trade relationship.

Still a Long Road Ahead.
What happens to the remaining 24% of suspended tariffs will depend on the outcome of the next 90 days of negotiations. Both sides agreed to establish a U.S.-China trade consultation mechanism for further dialogue. The Joint Statement does not directly address tariffs related to fentanyl, which may be handled separately. Some media have simplified the deal as the U.S. reducing tariffs from 145% to 30% and China from 125% to 10%. This is inaccurate. The U.S. figure includes 20% fentanyl-related tariffs, whereas the Chinese figure excludes its retaliatory measures in response to those.

Importantly, the Joint Statement specifies that “necessary measures will be taken to suspend or remove China’s non-tariff retaliatory measures against the U.S. starting April 2, 2025.” These non-tariff actions, announced after April 2 (especially on April 4), were responses to the 34% U.S. reciprocal tariffs. Since those tariffs have now been suspended or canceled, China’s corresponding non-tariff measures will be suspended or canceled as well. However, pre-April 2 actions, such as China’s February 4 export controls on tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum, and indium, remain in place—these were reactions to the U.S. fentanyl tariffs. Similarly, previous export controls on antimony, gallium, and germanium remain unchanged.

The Joint Statement does not address the U.S. Section 301 tariffs, which China continues to oppose and will likely raise again in future talks. The U.S. Section 232 national security tariffs, applied globally to steel, aluminum, autos and auto parts, may also expand to copper, wood, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and critical minerals. On this, China aligns with most of the world in opposing such measures.

Pragmatism.
China has consistently demanded that the U.S. remove all unilateral tariffs that violate WTO rules. This position is firm and unchanged. If the U.S. genuinely seeks solutions, it should eliminate all such tariffs. However, China’s approach balances principle and flexibility. Some interpretations suggest China will only negotiate if the U.S. cancels all tariffs first—this is an overstatement. China’s long-standing stance is: “If you want to fight, we’ll fight; if you want to talk, the door is open.”

The recent large-scale suspension or cancellation of tariffs reflects positively on global economic stability. China’s core position has not changed: current retaliatory measures will remain in place as long as U.S. unilateral tariffs remain. These include 10% general reciprocal tariffs, 20% fentanyl tariffs, and the Section 301 tariffs (averaging about 19%). It is likely the U.S. will maintain a substantial portion of these tariffs for some time, and divergence between the two sides may persist.

Ultimately, the root cause of the U.S.'s external economic imbalances lies within the U.S. itself. If the U.S. genuinely pursues rebalancing through fair negotiations, China is willing to cooperate. But China will never accept coercion, threats, or tariff bullying.

“Struggle is the means to unity; unity is the goal of struggle. Seek unity through struggle, and unity will endure. Seek unity through concession, and unity will perish.”
Among the 166 WTO members, 165 continue to trade with each other under the principles of most-favored-nation treatment and bound tariffs. China’s commitment to upholding multilateral trade rules inspires other countries opposing tariff hegemony. By defending WTO principles and rules to the fullest, and by opposing unlawful unilateral tariffs, we can minimize the harm caused by protectionism.