China expressed serious concerns over the recent U.S. restrictive economic and trade measures in the latest high level meeting
On July 30, Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng held a video call with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer.
According to the Chinese readout, the two sides discussed implementing the consensus reached by the two heads of state at their Beijing meeting, maintaining stable economic and trade relations, expanding practical cooperation, and properly addressing each other’s concerns.
On July 30, Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, China's lead official for China-U.S. economic and trade affairs, held a video call with his U.S. counterparts, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. The two sides held candid, in-depth, and constructive discussions on implementing the important consensus reached by the two heads of state during their meeting in Beijing, maintaining stable China-U.S. economic and trade relations in the next stage, expanding practical cooperation, and properly addressing each other's concerns. The Chinese side expressed serious concerns over the recent U.S. restrictive economic and trade measures against China. The two sides agreed that, under the strategic guidance of the two heads of state, they will further make full use of the China-U.S. economic and trade consultation mechanism, strengthen communication, enhance mutual trust, address each other's concerns, expand cooperation, promote the stable and positive development of bilateral economic and trade relations, and contribute to building a constructive and strategically stable China-U.S. relationship.
One sentence in the Chinese statement deserves particular attention: “The Chinese side expressed serious concerns over the recent U.S. restrictive economic and trade measures against China.”
It is worth reviewing what these “restrictive measures” refer to. In the week leading up to the call, the United States either introduced or signaled new restrictions across tariffs, robotics, energy equipment, telecommunications components, and artificial intelligence.
On July 23, the United States announced a new round of Section 301 tariffs targeting products associated with forced labor. Citing the failure of other economies to take sufficient measures to prevent goods produced with forced labor from entering global supply chains, the White House imposed an additional 12.5% tariff on products from China and around 60 other economies. Unlike the broader tariffs previously challenged in U.S. courts under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), this action relies on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Beijing is likely concerned that Washington is repackaging broad-based tariffs into a series of legally distinct Section 301 actions based on different policy justifications, making them more difficult to reverse in the future.
On July 28, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced restrictions on new foreign-manufactured advanced mobile robots and grid-connected power inverters entering the U.S. market. The policy covers humanoid robots, quadruped robots, and other devices that rely on wireless connectivity to navigate or perform autonomous functions. Although the rule is technology-neutral on its face, its practical target is widely understood to be Chinese manufacturers. Rather than banning existing products, the FCC is restricting new models from obtaining equipment authorization. Products that have already received authorization will not automatically lose their approvals, although the FCC retains the authority to revoke them in the future.
During the same week, the FCC also adopted rules preventing products containing specified logic components from companies on the FCC’s Covered List, including Huawei and ZTE, from obtaining equipment authorization. As a result, the scope of U.S. restrictions has expanded beyond complete telecommunications equipment to include internal chips, modules, and control components incorporated into a wide range of products.
Meanwhile, U.S. government officials and members of Congress have increasingly accused certain Chinese AI companies of acquiring the capabilities of leading U.S. models through model distillation, account circumvention, or access to export-controlled computing resources. Moonshot AI and its Kimi models have received particular attention. The U.S. government is reportedly evaluating whether to respond through export controls, Entity List designations, or other sanctions tools.
The U.S. Department of War has also recently expanded its Section 1286 list to include several Chinese universities under the “problematic activities” framework established by the National Defense Authorization Act. The practical consequences extend well beyond symbolic designation, affecting eligibility for U.S. federal research funding, university partnerships, academic exchanges, laboratory procurement, and participation in advanced research networks.
On July 29, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced new Iran-related sanctions targeting entities registered in Hong Kong or linked to offices in Shenzhen as part of Iran’s oil transportation and “shadow fleet” network. Designation on the SDN List typically cuts designated entities off from the U.S. dollar financial system, transactions involving U.S. persons, and compliance channels used by major international banks, with broader spillover effects on shipping, insurance, trade finance, and energy supply chains.
The U.S. readout framed the call primarily around implementation and institutional mechanisms, with particular emphasis on China’s commitments regarding rare earth exports and agricultural trade. Washington appears focused on ensuring that Beijing follows through on the commitments made during the leaders’ meeting, while Beijing is seeking to discourage the United States from introducing additional restrictive measures after the meeting.
Today,US Trade Representative Greer and I spoke with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng ahead of President Trump and President Xi’s meeting in September.
In our discussion, I emphasized that we expect Beijing to fully meet its commitments on rare earths and U.S. agricultural products. We also discussed implementation of the Trade and Investment Boards as a mechanism to secure concrete progress toward a more balanced, fair, and constructive U.S.-China economic relationship.
In the near term, both sides are likely to continue managing frictions through the bilateral economic and trade consultation mechanism. However, the recent series of U.S. restrictive measures may already represent an important test of whether China and the United States can maintain constructive strategic stability despite intensifying competition.
The fact that He Lifeng personally stepped in suggests that China is preparing to retaliate.
Trump may reach a friendly understanding with Xi Jinping, but unlike China, he has limited ability to restrain individual agencies from advancing their own agendas.
These measures are being advanced continuously by Congress and professional bureaucracies across the U.S. government, often independently of whatever understanding may have been reached at the presidential level. This institutional fragmentation is one of the most difficult features of the China–U.S. relationship.
U.S. policy is becoming increasingly systematic. Export controls, tariffs, FCC equipment authorization, sanctions, Entity Lists and investment restrictions are gradually merging into a comprehensive framework governing market access, technology diffusion and critical infrastructure. Rather than one dramatic escalation, Washington is constructing a permanent architecture of selective decoupling.
When agreements reached at the highest level cannot constrain subsequent restrictions, Beijing has little reason to rely on verbal assurances. The most effective response available to China remains tighter controls over rare-earth exports.